Bessent

On Monday, financial containment appeared to be winning. The Nikkei rallied 2.88%. Oil, which had touched $119 on Brent, collapsed to the high $80s after Trump told CBS News that the war was “very complete, pretty much”. By Wednesday the IEA had announced the largest coordinated oil reserve release in its history: 400 million barrels from 32 member nations. The US contributed 172 million barrels from the SPR. Japan committed 80 million barrels, its first solo reserve release since 1978. Bessent unsanctioned Russian crude stranded on the water, creating additional supply at the stroke of a pen. G7 energy ministers convened in Paris. Trump declared victory. ...

Two days ago, this blog argued that Bessent held the line but the line was thinner. On Tuesday, Iran began laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz. On Wednesday, the IEA announced the largest emergency oil release in its history: 400 million barrels. Brent crude barely flinched, settling around $93. The containment failed. Not because Bessent’s tools were wrong, but because mines changed the physics of the problem. Why mines changed everything The market had been pricing a scenario: Hormuz reopens when the shooting stops. Trump says the war is “very complete.” Escorts arrive. Tankers resume. Oil falls. That was the trade on Monday, when the Nikkei bounced 2.88% and Brent dropped from $119 to $88. ...

Ten days ago, Brent crude was $66. On Monday it touched $119.50 before settling around $93. The Nikkei 225 fell 5.2% on Monday. USD/JPY hit 159.14, one tick from what traders regard as the Ministry of Finance intervention threshold. The UST 10-year yield briefly breached 4.21% before pulling back to 4.13%. And yet the financial system did not crack. This article examines what Scott Bessent spent to keep it that way, what it reveals about the yen’s role in a crisis and why his binding constraint (the 10-year yield) is tighter now than it was before the first missile was launched. ...

This is a follow-up to The Hidden Overall Commander of Operation Epic Fury May Have Been the Treasury Secretary. That piece argued that the economic logic of the operation pointed to Scott Bessent as the architect of its financial constraints. One week later, the framework still holds. But the scenario it depended on is under severe strain. The original thesis rested on a single pivot point: the Strait of Hormuz would reopen quickly, Iranian oil infrastructure, deliberately preserved, would become the basis of a deal, and oil prices would fall far enough to solve five of Bessent’s problems simultaneously. ...

On the night of 28 February, 2026, Vice President JD Vance monitored Operation Epic Fury from the White House Situation Room. According to WBUR/AP reporting, he was joined by Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and one person whose presence might seem unusual in a military operation: Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth called the operation “the most lethal, most complex, and most-precision aerial operation in history.” But I find myself wondering: was this operation designed by the military, or shaped by someone who thinks in bond yields, oil futures, and capital flows? ...

In the third week of January 2026, Japan’s 40-year government bond yield surged past 4% for the first time since the bond’s inception, eventually reaching 4.24%. The 10-year JGB yield hit 2.38%, its highest level in 27 years. It was the most violent sell-off in Japanese government debt in decades, and it sent shockwaves through bond markets in New York and London. If you are an American or European investor, you might have dismissed this as a local Japanese story. That would be a mistake. What happens in the JGB market affects your Treasury yields, your mortgage rate and the stability of the global fixed-income market in ways that are not immediately obvious but are profoundly important. ...