Boj

Donald Trump extended the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire by three weeks on Thursday, pushing the 26 April expiry to mid-May. For speculators holding a yen short built to pay out on that discrete binary, the event has not dissolved; it has moved, into the same fortnight as Scott Bessent’s scheduled Tokyo stopover on his way to Mr Trump’s summit with Mr Xi in China. The shift matters because the dollar-yen floor at 160 is held not by any change in Japanese interest rates but by a new bilateral arrangement. Satsuki Katayama, Japan’s finance minister, threatens intervention; Mr Bessent, US treasury secretary, endorses her by declining to contradict her in public. This is the intervention-acquiescence model: US tacit consent to Japanese currency defence, in lieu of the January pressure on the Bank of Japan to raise rates. ...

There are two kinds of statement a finance minister makes: the spoken and the withheld. When America’s treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, met his Japanese counterpart, Satsuki Katayama, in Washington on 15 April, the unspoken carried the weight. When the two last met, in January, the Treasury’s readout noted that Mr Bessent “emphasized the need for sound formulation and communication of monetary policy”, diplomatic code for pressing the Bank of Japan to raise rates. That sentence is absent from the April readout. Ms Katayama, for her part, told reporters that the two ministers had not discussed monetary policy. ...

Scott Bessent worked at Soros Fund Management across two stints between 1991 and 2015, doing one thing supremely well: spotting the moment when a central bank had mispriced risk and the speculative position on the other side was too large to unwind gracefully. When that moment came, the correction was violent. The people positioned for it made fortunes. Bessent was one of the best. Now he runs the US Treasury. Japan holds roughly $1.2 trillion of American government debt, the largest foreign position — a mix of official reserves and private institutional holdings. If the yen weakens far enough, the private side of that equation starts to shift: life insurers and pension funds find hedging costs too high to justify holding US bonds, and new purchases dry up. US borrowing costs rise. ...

Go to any Japanese supermarket and pick up a round box of Snow Brand Megmilk’s “6P Cheese.” Open it and you will find six silver-wrapped wedges of processed cheese arranged like pie slices. The product has been sold in Japan since 1954 – a national staple that appears in children’s lunchboxes, office bento and late-night snacks with a beer. Every Japanese person knows it. When 6P Cheese launched in 1954, a box weighed 170g and each wedge was 19mm thick. In 2026, it weighs 102g and the wedges are 11mm. The diameter of the round box has not changed. Only the contents have shrunk: 40% over 70 years. ...

Energy costs are rising. Interest rates are rising. Raw material costs are rising. All three are happening at once, and all three trace back to the same chokepoint: the Strait of Hormuz, effectively closed since 28 February and still not reopened despite the 8 April ceasefire. In a country that imports 94.2% of its crude from the Middle East, there is no path to consumption growth while this persists. This blog has been bullish on Japan: rising wages, the end of deflation, corporate governance reform. That broad view is not being abandoned. But the hope that the “new Japan” narrative extends to domestic consumption is not supported by the data. The structural reasons why Japan’s policy response is inadequate are explored in a companion piece, The Shrinkflation State. This article traces the macro data and its implications for corporate earnings. ...

Japan’s budget passed. The ceasefire is collapsing. Katayama’s intervention window is open for the first time since she took office.

The incentive structure around US Gulf policy resembles a sold put on regional stability. The licensing portfolio, the 10-year yield and the petrol price all sit on the same side of the strike. The gamma is short. The implications reach the BOJ. This blog has spent the past month tracking Bessent’s financial containment of the Iran crisis: the SPR releases, the unsanctioned crude, the yield curve management. A question that keeps surfacing is whether the Trump Organization’s commercial presence in the Gulf reinforces that containment bias. ...

Japan’s FSA is quietly reversing 28 years of bank-industry separation. The market hasn’t noticed.

Japan holds 254 days of oil in reserve. That number has been repeated so often since 28 February that it has become a kind of talisman, proof that the country can absorb anything the Strait of Hormuz throws at it. It is also misleading. On 16 March, Prime Minister Takaichi ordered the largest oil reserve release in Japanese history: 80 million barrels, equivalent to 45 days of domestic consumption. The draw came from both private and government stockpiles and was coordinated with a 400-million-barrel IEA-wide release across 32 member nations. Japan’s contribution was the second largest after the United States. ...

Somewhere between $250 billion and $4 trillion, a ghost lives. The yen carry trade (borrow cheaply in Japan, invest where yields are higher) has been the subject of a strange argument since the August 2024 unwind sent the Nikkei down 12% in a single session. One camp says the trade is dead. The other says it never left. Both cite data. Both sound confident. They cannot both be right, and at USD/JPY 160.46 with the vice finance minister invoking “resolute measures” for the first time in his tenure, the answer has stopped being academic. ...