Boj

The incentive structure around US Gulf policy resembles a sold put on regional stability. The licensing portfolio, the 10-year yield and the petrol price all sit on the same side of the strike. The gamma is short. The implications reach the BOJ. This blog has spent the past month tracking Bessent’s financial containment of the Iran crisis: the SPR releases, the unsanctioned crude, the yield curve management. A question that keeps surfacing is whether the Trump Organization’s commercial presence in the Gulf reinforces that containment bias. ...

Japan’s FSA is quietly reversing 28 years of bank-industry separation. The market hasn’t noticed.

Japan holds 254 days of oil in reserve. That number has been repeated so often since 28 February that it has become a kind of talisman, proof that the country can absorb anything the Strait of Hormuz throws at it. It is also misleading. On 16 March, Prime Minister Takaichi ordered the largest oil reserve release in Japanese history: 80 million barrels, equivalent to 45 days of domestic consumption. The draw came from both private and government stockpiles and was coordinated with a 400-million-barrel IEA-wide release across 32 member nations. Japan’s contribution was the second largest after the United States. ...

Somewhere between $250 billion and $4 trillion, a ghost lives. The yen carry trade (borrow cheaply in Japan, invest where yields are higher) has been the subject of a strange argument since the August 2024 unwind sent the Nikkei down 12% in a single session. One camp says the trade is dead. The other says it never left. Both cite data. Both sound confident. They cannot both be right, and at USD/JPY 160.46 with the vice finance minister invoking “resolute measures” for the first time in his tenure, the answer has stopped being academic. ...

Predicting when a finance minister will intervene in the currency market is a fool’s errand. The MOF does not publish a schedule. The whole point of intervention is surprise: catching speculators wrong-footed, inflicting maximum pain per yen spent. Anyone claiming to know the date is selling you something. And yet. The decision to intervene is not made in a vacuum. It requires political clearance, diplomatic coordination and tactical conditions that do not appear on demand. These constraints are visible. They can be mapped against a calendar. The result will not be a date circled in red but a window, the period during which the political stars align and the MOF gains the freedom to act. ...

In a long-form interview from the Treasury’s Cash Room on 13 March, a week before the worst single-session bond selloff of his tenure, Bessent compared himself to a lifeguard. Drowning people pull you under, he told the interviewer. Your goal is always to save them. For fourteen months he has had solid ground. When JGB yields spiked in January on fiscal fears around the Takaichi snap election, he called Tokyo and the stress faded within days. When the carry trade wobbled in January, a Fed rate check on dollar-yen was enough. Those problems originated in places he could reach. ...

Within twenty-four hours, the two central banks that matter most for Japanese equity investors held their policy rates steady. The Bank of Japan kept its overnight call rate at 0.75 per cent. The Federal Reserve kept its federal funds rate at 3.50–3.75 per cent. Both decisions were expected. Neither was the story. The story is in the dissents, and in what they reveal about the diverging trajectories of the world’s two largest bond markets, the unwinding of the yen carry trade and why TOPIX, and Japanese financial stocks in particular, are positioned to outperform global indices through the turbulence ahead. ...

Two days ago, this blog argued that Bessent held the line but the line was thinner. On Tuesday, Iran began laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz. On Wednesday, the IEA announced the largest emergency oil release in its history: 400 million barrels. Brent crude barely flinched, settling around $93. The containment failed. Not because Bessent’s tools were wrong, but because mines changed the physics of the problem. Why mines changed everything The market had been pricing a scenario: Hormuz reopens when the shooting stops. Trump says the war is “very complete.” Escorts arrive. Tankers resume. Oil falls. That was the trade on Monday, when the Nikkei bounced 2.88% and Brent dropped from $119 to $88. ...

The Bank of Japan’s policy board meets on 18 March–19 with the overnight rate at 0.75%, the highest in thirty years. The market expects a hold. The decision itself is not the story. The language is. Two forces are pulling in opposite directions, and the words the BOJ chooses to describe the balance between them will determine whether April remains a live meeting or whether the next hike slips to June or beyond. ...

For three decades, betting on Japanese banks was an exercise in masochism. Negative rates crushed margins. Balance sheets swelled but profits did not. Then the Bank of Japan started hiking, and the masochists discovered they had been sitting on a convex payoff all along. The three megabanks are on course for record profits. MUFG has guided for 2.1 trillion yen, SMFG for 1.5 trillion, Mizuho for 1.13 trillion. The common explanation is that higher rates mean fatter margins. This is true as far as it goes, which is not very far. ...